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Taking Friends For Granted: The Carter Administration, Jordan, and the Camp David 
Accords, 1977–80 
 
At the 1978 Camp David summit, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat negotiated two framework documents intended to open the 
way to broader peace in the Middle East. While the Egyptian-Israeli framework paved the 
way to the signature of a bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979, the 
other framework document, for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, proved to be 
stillborn. Its fate was decided by another leader who was not present but whose country was 
assigned key responsibilities in the document: King Hussein of Jordan. Indeed, what is most 
striking about the Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David is the 
extent of the responsibilities it assigned to a country not a party to its negotiation. Jordan was 
referred to fourteen times in section A of the document dealing with the central question of 
transitional arrangements for the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
compared to only nine references to Egypt, one of the actual signatories of the document. Nor 
were the references to Jordan token. The document required Jordan to participate in 
negotiations for “the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects,” to “agree on the 
modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza,” 
to participate in joint patrols with Israeli forces and the manning of control posts “to assure 
the security of the borders,” and “to conclude a peace treaty” with Israel by the end of a five-
year transitional period.1 These fundamental obligations would have impinged on Jordanian 
                                                 
1 “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David,” quoted from William 
B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, DC, 1986), Appendix G, 
376–83. 
2 
sovereignty had the framework document been enacted. The question arises as to why the 
Carter administration brokered the agreement in the absence of the Jordanian head of state? In 
diplomacy, taking friends for granted can be a perilous approach. 
Camp David was not the first or last summit at which great powers would dispose of 
the future of smaller powers without reference to their wishes. But the Carter administration’s 
failure to bring Jordan along was a low point in its diplomacy. Although the broader Camp 
David framework agreement foundered on Jordan’s refusal to take up the responsibilities 
assigned to it, the role of relations with Jordan is curiously underdeveloped in the 
historiography of the Carter administration’s Middle East policy.2 William B. Quandt, in his 
seminal study, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, is one of the few historians to 
consider Jordan before and after Camp David and his verdict on the administration’s approach 
is highly critical: “Carter,” he wrote, “basically seemed to share Sadat’s view that the reaction 
of the other Arabs did not much matter. They would simply have to accept the new facts. This 
was a serious misjudgment.” While Quandt argues that Hussein’s “overt support” for Camp 
                                                 
2 Among the limited number of works to address this theme are Adam M. Garfinkle, 
“Negotiating by Proxy: Jordanian Foreign Policy and US Options in the Middle East,” Orbis 
24 (1981): 847–80; Emile Sahliyeh, “Jordan and the Palestinians,” in The Middle East Ten 
Years after Camp David, ed. William B. Quandt, (Washington, DC, 1988). Discussion in the 
broader literature on the Carter administration’s foreign policy and Camp David is almost 
completely absent. Isolated references can be found in Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White 
House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY, 
2009), 160; Daniel Strieff, Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential 
Diplomacy (Basingstoke, 2015), 92, 134; Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign 
Policy of the Carter Administration (De Kalb, IL, 2008), 80, 84. 
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David was probably unattainable, his “tacit endorsement” could have been gained. “But,” he 
laments, “we never made the necessary effort, nor did Sadat.”3 Quandt’s use of the first 
person underlines that this observation is both that of a historian and of a National Security 
Council staffer reporting on the Arab-Israeli conflict directly to President Jimmy Carter’s 
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.4 Several broader studies of the reign of King 
Hussein and of U.S.-Jordanian relations have taken similarly negative views of the Carter 
administration’s approach.5  
In a recent, positive assessment of the administration’s achievements at Camp David, 
Jeremy Pressman represents Hussein as a key proponent of what he terms the most negative 
assessment of Camp David: that it was “an American-Israeli conspiracy to prevent Palestinian 
self-determination and ensure Israeli control of the West Bank.” Pressman cites Hussein’s 
comments that Camp David was a “fig leaf,” which provided “sugarcoating” for the Begin 
Plan, amounting to permanent Israeli occupation of the West Bank.6 Much of Pressman’s 
subsequent analysis is devoted to challenging this claim by showing that the Carter 
administration sincerely sought Palestinian self-determination, an end to Israeli settlement-
building, and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. But is it accurate to represent 
                                                 
3 Quandt, Camp David, 312. 
4 Quandt, Camp David, xi. 
5 Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New Haven, 2008), 193–209; Avi 
Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in Peace and War (London, 2007), 391–
406; Madiha Rashid al-Madfai, Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process 
(Cambridge, 1993), 46–61. 
6 Jeremy Pressman, “Explaining the Carter Administration’s Israeli-Palestinian Solution,” 
Diplomatic History 37 (2013): 1121.  
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Hussein’s response to Camp David as little more than that of than an ill-informed conspiracy 
theorist, who should instead have trusted the good intentions of the framers of the document? 
This question will be explored here first by setting U.S.-Jordanian relations over the peace 
process in a longer-term context, and then by exploring in detail the bilateral discussions 
during the Carter administration. The breakdown in U.S.-Jordanian relations over Camp 
David was a result of Hussein’s well-founded mistrust of U.S. intentions. While this mistrust 
had longer-term origins, it was considerably exacerbated by the Carter administration’s 
conduct. Although Hussein was wrong to suggest a formal American-Israeli conspiracy over 
the Camp David accords, he was right that they exposed the shallowness of Carter’s 
commitment to a comprehensive peace in the region. By devolving responsibility to Jordan to 
implement the framework, Carter sought to maintain the appearance of progress toward 
ending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, knowing that the Begin government 
had no intention of withdrawing. He chose the immediate political gain represented by an 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement, rather than the hard political course of pursuing Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank. Hussein was primed for this outcome by his previous 
experience of U.S. policy, and his refusal to cooperate exposed the deception at the heart of 
the Camp David framework. In outlining this argument, this article draws on the array of 
declassified U.S. primary sources now available, together with Jordanian sources drawn from 
the Royal Hashemite Archives. As a third point of reference British government primary 
sources have also been used. Because the British had excellent connections in Washington 
and a history of close relations with Jordan, both parties often used them as a sounding board. 
On the Jordanian side, the focus here will be to a large extent on the personal role of 
King Hussein. While Hussein had to consider reactions to the Camp David summit within 
Jordan, especially among the East Bank elite, he was the key decisionmaker framing 
Jordanian policy. Indeed, key elements of the peace process, such as the extensive covert 
5 
contacts with Israeli leaders, were his almost exclusive preserve although he sometimes took 
trusted confidantes, such as Zeid Rifai, the Jordanian Prime Minister between 1973 and 1976, 
to meetings with the Israelis.7 On the U.S. side, the cast of decisionmakers was considerably 
larger, but during the Camp David process, Carter’s role loomed unusually large. He engaged 
to an exceptional extent in the detailed diplomacy of peacemaking. Thus, personal relations 
between Hussein and Carter mattered to an unusual degree in U.S.-Jordanian relations 
between 1977 and 1980.  
Hussein’s public persona was one of polished manners, charm, and good humor. He 
was a fluent English-speaker whose measured delivery reflected his careful choice of words. 
But his easy manner concealed a core determination to defend what he saw as the dignity of 
his throne and his own conception of Arab nationalism. He was thus considerably less 
malleable than first impressions might have suggested. Carter meanwhile combined his own 
surface charm with what his friend and adviser, Charles Hughes Kirbo, privately described as 
“a short fuse” and “a streak of obstinacy” tending to make him intolerant of dissenting 
                                                 
7 For further discussion of Jordanian-Israeli relations, see Alexander Bligh, The Political 
Legacy of King Hussein (Brighton, 2002); Adam Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow 
of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a Small Place (New York, 1992); Yehuda 
Lukacs, Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process (Syracuse, 1997); Joseph Nevo, King Hussein 
and the Evolution of Jordan’s Perception of a Political Settlement with Israel, 1967–1988 
(Brighton, 2006); Avi Raz, The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians in 
the Aftermath of the June 1967 War (New Haven, 2012). 
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opinions.8 While the charm might flow in discussions between the two men in good times, 
their deeper character traits contained potential for discord. 
Over dinner with British Prime Minister James Callaghan on February 22, 1978, 
Hussein returned repeatedly to a theme he called “Resolution 242 syndrome.” “He was deeply 
afraid,” he told Callaghan, “of a re-run of the Resolution 242 saga.” Elaborating further, he 
explained that, “it was essential to know what the end result would be . . . He recalled with 
some bitterness the letters he had received from President Johnson and President Nixon 
telling him what Resolution 242 really meant.”9 As these comments make clear, the 
diplomacy surrounding the negotiation and implementation of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 242, passed on November 22, 1967, formed Hussein’s first essential point 
of reference for the Camp David process a decade later. This is unsurprising. Resolution 242 
laid the foundation for the post–1967 peace process in the shape of a “land for peace” 
formula.10 So, the resolution coupled a call for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 
                                                 
8 Telegram from Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham, Embassy Washington, to Foreign Secretary 
David Owen, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (hereafter FCO), no. 946, March 3, 1977, 
PREM16/1485, The National Archives of the UK (hereafter TNA).  
9 Note of a Conversation at the Prime Minister’s Dinner for King Hussein of Jordan at 10 
Downing Street, February 22, 1978, PREM16/1732, TNA. 
10 For further discussion of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, see Nigel 
Ashton, “Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,” The International History Review 38 
(2016): 24–44; Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht, 1985); David 
McDowall, “Clarity or Ambiguity? The Withdrawal Clause of UN Security Council 
Resolution 242,” International Affairs 90 (2014): 1367–81. 
7 
territories occupied in the recent conflict” with the “termination of all claims or states of 
belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure 
and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”11  
But Hussein’s reference to a Resolution 242 “syndrome” or “saga” requires further 
explanation. In essence, the “saga” from Hussein’s perspective was made up of three 
elements—the negotiation, the interpretation, and the implementation of the resolution—in 
which the United States played a central role. In terms of negotiation, between the end of the 
June war and the intensive discussions in November 1967 resulting in the passage of 
Resolution 242, the United States had backtracked from a position calling for territorial 
integrity for all states in the region to one accommodating the Israeli opposition to full 
withdrawal.12 The key reason why Hussein did not subscribe to the draft resolution sponsored 
by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg during the first week of 
November 1967 was the mistrust that this erosion of the U.S. position had engendered. Even a 
formal commitment delivered via Goldberg to the effect that “the U.S. is prepared to support 
a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications,” and would use its 
maximum efforts to bring this result about, did not entice Hussein to support the U.S. draft.13 
                                                 
11 United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, quoted from Arthur Lall, The UN and the 
Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York, 1968), 308–9. 
12 Memorandum, Battle to Rusk, November 5, 1967, #8a, folder “Jordan: Informal Working 
Visit of Hussein 11/6-9/67 [1 of 2],” Country File, National Security File (hereafter NSF), 
box 148, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (hereafter LBJ Library). 
13 The only formal record of the text of this commitment is contained in a subsequent 
telegram sent after Hussein asked for it to be repeated to him a year later: State Department to 
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Nevertheless, this U.S. commitment was the precursor to Hussein’s acceptance of the text of 
Resolution 242 as sponsored by the British government. After the resolution passed 
unanimously in the Security Council on November 22, 1967, what mattered to Hussein was 
what the United States would do to secure Israeli withdrawal and the return of the West Bank 
to Jordan, thus honoring its commitment. The answer from his perspective was very little. 
While Hussein, at considerable personal risk, entered into a covert process of negotiation with 
Israeli leaders, the Johnson administration did not follow up by supporting the return of the 
West Bank to Jordan.14 No significant pressure was exerted on Israel. By the time Hussein 
requested the formal restatement of this U.S. commitment a year later, he had already lost 
faith in the intentions of the United States to implement Resolution 242.15 This, then, was the 
“Resolution 242 saga” in Hussein’s mind. 
Nor was the Resolution 242 saga the only lingering controversy in U.S.-Jordanian 
relations. During the September 1970 confrontation between the Hashemite regime and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), although the Nixon administration offered Hussein 
public support, it dithered in private in the face of Hussein’s repeated entreaties for military 
intervention.16 The crisis confirmed a pattern established during the Resolution 242 saga of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Embassy Tel Aviv, November 30, 1968, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter 
FRUS), 1964–68, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, ed. Harriet D. Schwar 
(Washington, DC, 2004), doc. 506. 
14 For further discussion of Hussein’s covert diplomacy during this period, see Raz, The Bride 
and the Dowry; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 278–310. 
15 State Department to Tel Aviv, November 30, 1968, FRUS, vol. XIX, doc. 506. 
16 For further discussion of the U.S. role in the September 1970 crisis, see Nigel Ashton, 
“Pulling the Strings: King Hussein’s Role in the Crisis of 1970 in Jordan,” The International 
 
9 
the United States offering words not actions in support of its commitments. After the crisis, in 
March 1972, Hussein proposed his own plan, the United Arab Kingdom (UAK), a federation 
of the East Bank and West Bank under his ultimate authority, as a way of breaking the 
deadlock over the occupied territories.17 The pattern was repeated. Washington offered a 
public welcome for the proposal but took no action to restart the peace process. The reaction 
from the Arab states, meanwhile, was negative, with Egypt under its new leader President 
Anwar Sadat severing diplomatic relations with Jordan over the plan. While Sadat presented 
his decision as a defense of Palestinian national rights, Hussein saw it as an opportunistic 
maneuver on Sadat’s part designed to enhance his credentials as Nasser’s successor. The roots 
of the tensions that would emerge between the two men over the Camp David process were 
thus already apparent.18 
In contrast to June 1967, Hussein largely kept Jordan on the sidelines during the 
October 1973 war despite pressure from Syria and Egypt to engage his forces. Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, who had earlier commended Hussein’s statesmanship in keeping 
Jordan out of the conflict, wrote to him again on October 19, 1973 promising that, in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
History Review 28 (2006): 94–118; Douglas Little, “A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer: The 
United States, King Hussein and Jordan, 1953–1970,” The International History Review 17 
(1995): 512–44. 
17 For the text of the plan, see Letter, Hussein to Nixon, March 13, 1972, White House Central 
File, Subject File, Countries, box 46, folder CO76, Jordan 1/1/71, Richard Nixon Presidential 
Papers, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (hereafter 
RNPP). 
18 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom (Washington, DC, 
1999), 207. 
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aftermath of the war, the United States would work toward a fundamental settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.19 “In such a settlement,” Kissinger promised, “it is inconceivable that 
the interests of Jordan . . . would not be fully protected. I give you a formal assurance to this 
effect.”20 But despite this formal assurance, Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy, resulting in 
disengagement agreements on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, was complemented by what 
amounted to side-step diplomacy on the Jordanian front. Given Israel’s refusal to countenance 
withdrawal from the West Bank, Kissinger concentrated his efforts elsewhere. So, the U.S. 
assurance that Jordan’s interests would be fully protected amounted once again to words 
rather than action. 
The impasse resulted in a decision at the summit meeting of Arab Heads of State at 
Rabat in October 1974 confirming “the right of the Palestinian people to establish an 
independent national authority under the command of the PLO, the sole legitimate 
representative of Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated.”21 The Rabat 
resolution substituted the PLO for Jordan as the Arab representative in any negotiation with 
Israel over the West Bank. Given that there was no prospect of Israel negotiating with the 
PLO, the Ford administration hastened to underline its support for a continuing Jordanian 
role. Kissinger formalized the U.S. position through a Memorandum of Agreement with the 
Israeli government stating that the U.S. would not recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it 
recognized Israel’s right to exist and accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
                                                 
19 Telegram, State Department to Embassy Amman, October 9, 1973, NSC, Country File, 
Middle East, box 618, folder Jordan vol. IX, Jan–Oct. 1973, RNPP. 
20 Telegram, State Department to Embassy Amman, October 19, 1973, NSC, Country File, 
Middle East, box 618, folder Jordan vol. IX, Jan–Oct. 1973, RNPP. 
21 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom, 210. 
11 
338.22 But Rabat still crystallized the central problem of Palestinian representation in the 
peace process. Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, and King Hussein were rivals for the allegiance 
of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Hussein’s claim was based on Jordan’s rule 
over the West Bank between 1948 and 1967, the Union of the Two Banks passed by the 
Jordanian Parliament in April 1950, and his continuing authority over the substantial 
Palestinian population in Jordan. Arafat’s claim was based on the PLO’s credentials as the 
national movement of all Palestinians whether in the occupied territories or in the diaspora. 
While the immediate legacy of Rabat was Hussein’s public recognition of the PLO claim, in 
private he told Western interlocutors that in the event of an Israeli agreement to full 
withdrawal, he would be willing to set the Rabat resolution to one side and negotiate over the 
future of the West Bank.23 
Hussein’s acceptance of the Rabat resolution reflected his frustration with U.S. policy. 
He believed it was the lack of progress in the peace process that had opened the way to Rabat. 
This frustration was deepened by a further controversy highlighting another source of tension 
in bilateral relations. Jordan’s attempt to buy Hawk surface-to-air missiles from the United 
States during 1975 provided a striking indication of the strength of the pro-Israel lobby in the 
U.S. Congress. A deal for the sale of the missiles to Jordan was eventually struck, but Hussein 
                                                 
22 Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of Israel and the United States: The 
Geneva Conference, September 1, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 
1974–1976, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington, DC, 2011), doc. 227. 
23 Memorandum of conversation (hereafter Memcon), Ford-Hussein, March 31, 1976, 
National Security Advisor’s Files (hereafter NSA): Memoranda of Conversations, box 18, 
folder March 30, 1976- Jordanian King Hussein, Gerald R. Ford Papers, Gerald R. Ford 
Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, (hereafter GRFP). 
12 
was forced to accept the humiliating provision that the batteries would be deprived of their 
mobility and concreted into fixed positions. This would make them easy targets for Israeli air 
strikes. As Hussein wrote to Kissinger, “how can the U.S. Government maintain its credibility 
and continue to be able to play an effective role in the Arab world if its pledges, promises and 
commitments, all made seriously and in good faith are not lived up to because of Israel’s 
friends in the Congress who seem to run the show there?”24 
 It was against this unpromising backdrop that the Carter administration took office in 
January 1977. Two concerns growing out of his previous experiences preoccupied Hussein by 
this stage. The first was that Egypt’s President Sadat was not fully committed to a multilateral 
approach and might instead decide to pursue a bilateral deal with Israel along the lines of the 
Sinai II agreement brokered by Kissinger in September 1975.25 This concern reflected the 
lack of trust between Hussein and Sadat dating back to Sadat’s opportunistic severing of 
diplomatic relations with Jordan over the UAK Plan in 1972. The second was that Jordan 
might be made the scapegoat for any concessions the Arab side was required to make over the 
West Bank as part of a renewed effort to move the peace process forward.26 As U.S. officials 
                                                 
24 Telegram, Hussein to Kissinger, July 23, 1975, NSA Country File Middle East/South Asia, 
box 22, folder Jordan – State Dept telegrams to SecState Nodis (11), GRFP. 
25 Embassy Amman to State Department, March 14, 1977, document 1977AMMAN01472, 
Access to Archival Databases, Central Foreign Policy File, 1973–78, Record Group 59, 
United States National Archives (hereafter USNA), http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-
list.jsp?cat=WR43 (accessed June 11 2015) (hereafter CFPF, 1973–78, USNA). 
26 Embassy Amman to State Department, January 16, 1977, document 1977AMMAN00275, 
CFPF, 1973–78, USNA; Embassy Amman to State Department, January 22, 1977, document 
1977AMMAN00410, ibid. 
13 
privately acknowledged, “the King’s general attitude is that if there must be any major 
concessions, he would like to have the PLO take the blame for them.”27 
 From the outset it was apparent that Carter wanted progress in the peace process 
during his first year in office.28 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance embarked on a tour of the 
region in mid-February 1977 to sound out the attitudes of Arab and Israeli leaders to the 
reconvening the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, which had met and adjourned in 
December 1973. But before Vance reached Jordan on February 18, 1977 two events took 
place that would have a significant impact on Hussein’s position. The first was a private 
tragedy. On the evening of February 9, Hussein’s third wife, Queen Alia, was killed when the 
royal helicopter crashed in bad weather on the return journey from a visit to a hospital at 
Tafila in southern Jordan. Alia’s death was huge personal blow for Hussein and for months 
afterwards he retreated into a shell of anguish and grief. But, as he later confided to Assistant 
Secretary of State Harold Saunders, there was another dimension to Alia’s death. Hussein told 
Saunders about the series of covert meetings he had held with Israeli leaders across the 
decade since the 1967 war. In his most sensitive and intimate observation of all “he said that 
in a sense his previous wife (Queen Alya) met her death (in a night helicopter crash) as a 
result of this effort because it was necessary to do extensive night flying in [the] royal 
helicopter to provide a cover for the use of [the] helicopter for night meetings with [the] 
                                                 
27 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, April 19, 1977, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. 
VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, ed. Adam M. Howard, (Washington, 
DC, 2013), doc. 28. 
28 Quandt, Camp David, 40. 
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Israelis.”29 Given the weather conditions on the day of her death, it would have been 
advisable for Alia to travel back by road from Tafila were it not for the standing instructions 
to use the royal helicopter for night travel wherever possible. Hussein thus blamed himself, 
and his covert peacemaking efforts, for his wife’s death. 
 Just over a week after Alia’s death, on the day of Vance’s arrival in Jordan, a story by 
Bob Woodward, “CIA Paid Millions to Jordan’s King Hussein,” broke in The Washington 
Post.30 It claimed that the CIA had made large, secret, annual payments to Hussein across a 
period of twenty years, and that Carter had ordered the payments stopped once he learned of 
them. It went on to claim that Hussein had needed money to “support his lifestyle,” that 
“Hussein himself had provided intelligence to the CIA,” and that “Hussein’s decisions have 
often been highly compatible with U.S. and Israeli interests.” The net effect of the story was 
to cast Hussein in the role of a spendthrift CIA lackey. The CIA Station Chief between 1963 
and 1971, Jack O’Connell, named by Woodward in a follow-up article the next day, poured 
scorn in his memoirs on the claims that the payments were for personal use, or that they 
                                                 
29 The sensitivity of this report is indicated by its handling restrictions: Embassy Jidda to State 
Department, October 18, 1978, “to INR McAfee only: please hand carry to NEA/Crawford 
for transmittal Eyes Only to Brzezinski for President from Saunders”, FRUS, 1977–80, vol. 
IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, ed. Alexander R. Wieland 
(Washington, DC, 2014), doc. 86.  
30 “CIA Paid Millions to Jordan’s King Hussein,” February 18, 1977, The Washington Post, 
section A1.  
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served to buy Hussein’s allegiance.31 Nor was it true that Carter saw the payments as 
improper. On the contrary, he wrote to Hussein describing the Post story as “misleading” and 
confirming that he saw “nothing illegal and improper in your relationship with us.”32 It is 
perhaps no coincidence that Carter also chose this moment to pen a personal letter of 
condolence to Hussein for the death of Queen Alia.33  But the damage was done. Egyptian 
Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy “insisted that after the recent revelation of CIA assistance to 
Hussein, no one can sign any paper with the King.”34 
 Vance speculated when he met Hussein that “it was his guess that the information had 
been leaked from a very low level and he did not know the reason for this. The King could be 
sure this did not reflect US Government views.” Since the payments had been reported the 
previous year to the Intelligence Oversight Board, the timing of the leak to Woodward was 
significant. Not only did it seriously compromise Hussein’s position just as the new 
administration began a push for peace negotiations, it also led him to question the foundations 
of his relationship with the United States.35 
                                                 
31 “White House Reviewing Intelligence Operations,” February 19, 1977, The Washington 
Post, section A1; Jack O’Connell with Vernon Loeb, King’s Counsel: A Memoir of War, 
Espionage, and Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York, 2011), 136–39. 
32 Letter, Carter to Hussein, March 12, 1977, President Carter File, Royal Hashemite 
Archives, Basman Palace, Amman, Jordan (hereafter RHA). 
33 Hand-written letter, Carter to Hussein, February 20, 1977, ibid. 
34 Telegram, Embassy Cairo to State Department, March 26, 1977, document 
1977CAIRO05157, CFPF, 1973–78, USNA. 
35 Telegram, Embassy Amman to Liaison Office Riyadh, Memcon on U.S.-Jordanian meeting, 
February 19, 1977, FRUS, vol. VIII, doc. 12. 
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 Nevertheless, when Hussein paid an official visit to Washington, D.C. in late April, 
the atmosphere was relatively positive, with Hussein singling out for praise Carter’s 
dedication to the peace process.36 In a meeting with Carter on April 25, Hussein observed that 
“I feel more happy and at ease on this visit than on any previous one.” Carter was generous in 
his response: “if all leaders were like you it would be possible to have a permanent peace. 
You are strong and gracious and have a constructive attitude toward peace.”37 But the 
substantive obstacles to reconvening the Geneva Conference remained significant. First, the 
May 1977 elections in Israel soon produced a political earthquake: the defeat of the ruling 
Labor Party by Menachem Begin’s Likud Party. Begin was ideologically committed to 
holding on to the West Bank and accelerating the pace of settlement-building in the occupied 
territories, so the prospects for negotiations appeared dim. Even if the Arabs could be 
persuaded to negotiate with the new Israeli government, there was a second significant 
problem over the composition of the Arab delegation. Would the Arabs attend the Geneva 
Conference as separate national delegations, or as one unified Arab delegation? If the former, 
how would the question of Palestinian representation be resolved? If the latter, how would 
negotiations over bilateral issues, such as Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai or the Golan 
Heights, be conducted? 
The third problem was that of reconciling the differences in policy between the United 
States and Soviet Union, the original co-sponsors of the Geneva conference. The Soviet 
                                                 
36 For a perceptive summary of Hussein’s mood ahead of his visit to Washington by 
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Union took a harder line over Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories than the United 
States, although the original Soviet support for Resolution 242 showed that there was some 
flexibility in Moscow’s position. 
Finally, the problems posed by inter-Arab rivalries, especially between President Sadat 
of Egypt and President Asad of Syria, but also between Sadat and Hussein, would have to be 
overcome. Suspicion between Sadat and Asad ran deep. Asad believed Sadat had betrayed 
him both during the October 1973 war and also during the subsequent U.S.-sponsored peace 
process. He expected Sadat to abandon the multilateral process and pursue a further bilateral 
Egyptian-Israeli deal as soon as the opportunity presented itself. His suspicion proved well 
founded. Hussein shared some of Asad’s suspicion of Sadat’s intentions. Jordanian-Egyptian 
relations had been distant and tense for most of Sadat’s presidency and were not helped by the 
personal dislike between the two men. Sadat had little respect for monarchy as an institution 
and regarded Hussein as an empire-builder who sought to extend his control over the West 
Bank for selfish dynastic reasons.38  
The initial indications regarding the position of the new Likud government were not 
positive. Vance told British Prime Minister Callaghan with some irony that, “as regards the 
West Bank, Mr Begin had started by saying ‘No’ and his position had progressively 
hardened.”39 Hussein was also pessimistic about the prospects for progress in the wake of 
Begin’s victory.40 The new Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, did indicate some possible 
flexibility in the government’s approach over the crucial issue of Palestinian representation 
within an Arab delegation to Geneva. He also arranged a further covert meeting with Hussein 
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in London on August 22, 1977.  But the meeting did not produce any breakthrough and 
Hussein later characterized it as a failure.41 
The issue of Palestinian representation was crucial because it crystallized the questions 
of Palestinian nationalism and self-determination. No party, whether Jordan, Israel, or the 
United States, was willing to countenance an unfettered exercise in Palestinian self-
determination in the occupied territories, but there were considerable differences of emphasis 
between their positions. Israel wanted to conduct bilateral negotiations with Jordan over the 
administration of the West Bank and opposed the creation of any Palestinian entity, let alone a 
state. Jordan advocated Palestinian self-determination in principle, but in practice continued 
to favor the UAK Plan of 1972, with any Palestinian entity created in the occupied territories 
being linked in a federal structure to Jordan. Meanwhile Carter indicated his personal 
sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians when, in answer to a question at a town hall 
meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts on March 16, 1977, he replied that “there has to be a 
homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years.”42 
Exactly what this commitment meant in practice remained a moot point.43 
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The challenges were such that by the end of the summer, the Carter administration had 
retreated from any attempt at substantive negotiation ahead of re-convening the Geneva 
Conference, and had lowered its sights instead “to simply getting to Geneva and avoiding an 
immediate breakdown.”44 Nevertheless, the letters exchanged by Carter and Hussein during 
summer 1977 do give a sense of momentum building toward a reconvening of the 
conference.45 On the issue of Palestinian representation, the gap between the Israeli and 
Jordanian positions was bridgeable. Neither party favored formal PLO representation at 
Geneva although both accepted that in practice any Palestinian delegates from the occupied 
territories would have links to the PLO. Dayan told Carter during a meeting on September 19 
that even an open admission from a Palestinian delegate that he was a PLO member would 
not mean the collapse of the conference “if everything else goes right.”46 Chief of the 
Jordanian Royal Court Abdul Hamid Sharaf told Vance on September 24, that Jordan was 
“open-minded about the ways of handling the Palestinian representation problem.”47  
It would have been possible, then, to finesse the issue of Palestinian representation at 
Geneva. In this regard, it was Sadat’s opposition to participating in a single Arab delegation 
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that proved the bigger obstacle.48 At any rate, Carter had no complaints about the Jordanian 
approach, telling Sharaf that “your government has been most cooperative and 
constructive.”49 Jordan’s flexibility was mirrored by signs of progress on the Israeli side. On 
October 5, Quandt notified Brzezinski that Dayan had taken a significant step by agreeing to 
drop his insistence that Palestinians should be buried in national delegations.50 Meanwhile, 
the issuing on October 1 of an unprecedented joint Statement on the Middle East by Vance 
and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had removed another obstacle to the re-convening of 
Geneva. This statement went beyond Resolution 242 in calling for “the resolution of the 
Palestinian question including ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” It 
affirmed that the Geneva Conference framework was “the only right and effective way for 
achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem,” and called on all 
parties to “facilitate in every way the resumption of the work of the conference not later than 
December 1977.”51 The joint statement was an exceptional example of U.S.-Soviet 
cooperation, which stood in contrast to the approach of the Ford or Nixon administrations.52 
Nevertheless, the considerable domestic political backlash against the statement, orchestrated 
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in large measure by supporters of Israel, meant that the administration was soon forced into a 
partial retreat, issuing a joint statement with Israel on October 5 to the effect that acceptance 
of the U.S.-Soviet communiqué was not a precondition for participation in the reconvened 
Geneva Conference.53 
Despite this setback, the correspondence between Carter and Hussein reflected an 
increased sense of optimism that the Geneva Conference might now be reconvened. On 
October 15, Hussein received a letter from Carter stating, “we have reached the point where 
the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference is a distinct possibility.”54 Writing in 
response on October 26, Hussein paid tribute to Carter’s commitment to a just settlement and 
his personal involvement in the process.55 On October 30, Carter wrote to Hussein once again, 
praising his constructive approach and expressing his strong belief that “we are now at a 
critical juncture in the efforts my administration has been making since taking office nine 
months ago to chart a course that will lead to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”56 It 
was at this juncture that Sadat decided to cut across the multilateral Geneva approach and 
instead take a dramatic unilateral initiative. On November 19 he flew to Jerusalem to speak 
before the Israeli Knesset. 
Sadat’s impatience had been building for some time. On October 28, the U.S. 
Ambassador in Cairo, Hermann Eilts, reported that Sadat had reiterated forcefully that he was 
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“fed up with the procedural debate” about Geneva.57 As Hussein shuttled around the region 
trying to reconcile differences between Asad and Sadat, Sadat broke ranks.58 In a top secret 
approach to Carter, he proposed a peace conference in the Arab sector of Jerusalem during 
December 1977, purportedly to prepare for a meeting of the Geneva Conference by June 
1978.59 Because Sadat must have known there was no chance that Asad or Hussein would 
attend a conference in Israeli-occupied territory, the letter was a transparent ploy to derail the 
multilateral Geneva process. In a response steeped in unconscious irony in view of what 
would follow, Carter replied to Sadat in precisely those terms: “after serious reflection,” he 
wrote, “I must tell you that this public announcement may seriously complicate, rather than 
facilitate, the search for peace in the Middle East.”60 
Regardless of Carter’s warning, Sadat plowed ahead, declaring before the Egyptian 
People’s Assembly on November 9 that he would be willing to “go to the Knesset itself” to 
insist on Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian rights.61 In view of Sadat’s apparent willingness to 
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break the Arab taboo over openly setting foot on Israeli soil, Carter now changed tack, 
commending his “courageous stand” and commitment to peace.62 The high drama of Sadat’s 
arrival in Jerusalem on November 19 promoted a sense of euphoria in Israel. In Jordan, the 
reaction was very different. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, who had developed a close 
working relationship with Hussein, reported to Washington on “one of the toughest 
conversations I have ever had with him.”63 Describing Hussein’s sense of “unmitigated 
bitterness and gloom,” Pickering went on to detail the King’s belief that Sadat had undercut 
his efforts to bring Syria and Egypt to Geneva together and had “betrayed every sacred 
principle of Arab unity in dealing with the Israelis by going to Jerusalem.” Hussein was 
convinced, Pickering wrote, that Sadat would now “strike off on his own with Israel” and that 
“this is what the Israelis have in mind.” Although he subsequently described Sadat’s move as 
“courageous,” Hussein believed in private that it was a fundamental transgression.64 He 
subsequently told National Security Adviser Brzezinski that: “the visit to Jerusalem under 
occupation had great religious significance. My grandfather is buried there . . . We lost 
Jerusalem in 1967 under Egyptian command . . . The Sadat visit was a very, very big 
shock.”65 
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It subsequently became an article of faith for Hussein that “the real peace was derailed 
by Sadat. We were close to Geneva. We were all getting ready to go.”66 No doubt this was too 
rosy an interpretation of the stage reached in negotiations over reconvening the Geneva 
conference. Difficulties remained, particularly in securing Syrian attendance.  But there was a 
kernel of truth in Hussein’s central point: that Sadat’s visit undermined the multilateral peace 
process meaning that the opportunity to pursue a comprehensive peace settlement in the 
Middle East at this juncture had now been sacrificed. 
Sadat’s visit was also a decisive juncture for U.S. policy and hence for U.S.-Jordanian 
relations. Although the Carter administration initially sought ways to reconcile Sadat’s 
initiative with the Geneva process, it soon became directly engaged in sustaining the 
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. While the administration continued to profess its commitment 
to the implementation of resolution 242 and the resolution of the Palestinian problem, in 
practice achieving an Egyptian-Israeli agreement became the clear priority of U.S. diplomacy. 
Although the pursuit of an Egyptian-Israeli peace deal was presented by the Carter 
administration as the essential precursor to a comprehensive peace, in fact it involved 
bypassing U.S. commitments regarding the implementation of resolution 242 in favor of 
consolidating the United States’ bilateral relationship with Egypt. For Hussein, who was 
primed by his experiences a decade earlier, the U.S. failure to insist on the full 
implementation of resolution 242 was a tragic case of history repeating itself. Worse still, a 
bilateral deal between Egypt and Israel would only make future Israeli withdrawal even more 
unlikely, because Israel would no longer be faced with a united Arab front. This, then, was the 
root cause of the parting of the ways between Carter and Hussein. It was a fundamental 
disagreement about the path to comprehensive peace in the region. 
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That the breach in U.S.-Jordanian relations would become so deep was not 
immediately apparent in the wake of Sadat’s visit. Hussein trod a delicate line, recognizing 
Sadat’s courage, but expressing surprise at his failure to consult his fellow Arabs. As he told 
Vance on December 12, his fundamental concern was that Sadat might now pursue a separate 
settlement with Israel.67 Vance for his part initially expressed some understanding of the 
“very awkward” position Hussein now faced.68 During a meeting with Carter in Tehran on 
New Year’s Day 1978, Hussein argued that he was doing all he could to support Sadat.69 That 
this would be the last meeting between the two leaders until Hussein’s visit to Washington in 
June 1980, two and a half years later, testified to Amman and Washington’s parting of ways. 
Already significant differences were evident in their responses to the so-called “Begin Plan” 
for Palestinian administrative autonomy in the occupied territories. While Carter hailed 
Begin’s proposal as a “serious and good step forward,” Hussein saw it as a dead end, a device 
to entrench the Israeli occupation with Jordanian cooperation.70 As the Egyptian-Israeli 
negotiations ground to a halt in January 1978, Hussein expressed deep, public skepticism that 
peace could be achieved: “I’ve done so much, I’ve hoped so much, my whole inclination, my 
whole feeling has been for peace, for a better future for the generations to come. All my 
efforts, my dreams—they are shattered.”71 Privately, U.S. officials now described his position 
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as “very negative,” noting that that there was not much difference in practice between his 
approach and that of President Asad of Syria.72 
To underline both his continuing commitment to the peace process and his doubts 
about the direction it had taken, Hussein wrote to Carter on March 13, 1978, stressing his two 
fundamental concerns: “for the present peace negotiations to progress and expand there must 
be some concrete indication shown by Israel that the negotiations would ultimately result in 
Israeli withdrawal and a just settlement of the Palestinian question based on the right of self-
determination.” But Hussein did not believe that the Begin government would be willing to 
make these commitments. “There are many signs,” he wrote, “that the Israeli leadership will 
not show the necessary historic vision to respond positively to President Sadat’s initiative.”73 
These twin principles were Hussein’s minimum requirement for engaging in the Egyptian-
Israeli peace process and he reiterated them on numerous occasions to U.S. interlocutors.74 
His aim was to persuade Carter that the Israeli position over the West Bank could not be 
finessed but would have to be confronted by his administration. 
The passages Hussein chose to underline in Carter’s reply to his letter are indicative of 
his concerns. “It is my hope that the process which we have begun will lead to broader 
negotiations which Jordan will be able to join . . . Knowing the strength of the bonds between 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, it has always been our view that final 
arrangements should provide for the restoration of ties between the two, and for the inclusion 
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of Gaza in this framework as well . . . The United States has, likewise, taken the position that 
the Palestinian people must participate in determination of their own future.”75 
 One vital element of the negotiations was out of the Carter administration’s hands. 
Despite repeated pleas, U.S. officials were unable to persuade Sadat to coordinate his 
approach with Hussein.76 The letters the two leaders exchanged between Sadat’s visit to 
Jerusalem and the Camp David summit provide a clear indication of the declining state of 
their relations.77 By the time Carter issued his invitation in August to Sadat and Begin to 
attend a summit at Camp David early the following month, the Hussein-Sadat relationship had 
reached a low ebb. In a relatively short letter, Sadat claimed he had only accepted the 
invitation to the summit because he thought it would provide the best venue to put Begin 
under pressure regarding withdrawal from the occupied territories. He also stressed his 
intention to try to divide Israel from the United States.78 In reply Hussein advocated a joint 
Arab peacemaking effort involving the Palestinians and warned of the danger that the summit 
might only produce a “declaration of principles which would cover Israel’s negative position 
in vague terms.” His concluding declaration of confidence in Sadat’s “deep Arab nationalism” 
reads more like a warning than a profession of faith.79 
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 The decline in Jordanian-Egyptian relations leading up to Camp David paralleled the 
trajectory of U.S.-Jordanian relations. Hussein’s refrain during this period concerned what he 
termed an “erosion” of the U.S. position. His point was that the United States had put on 
record its interpretation of Resolution 242 as requiring Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank 
with only minor boundary rectifications. Now, as part of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiating 
process, the Carter administration accepted an interim arrangement for the West Bank that 
would not specify withdrawal as its goal. When Ambassador Atherton visited Amman on 
August 12, he reported: “Hussein spoke more frankly than I have ever heard him of his 
apprehension that the US appeared to be pulling back from its position on [the] meaning of 
Resolution 242 conveyed to him over the years since 1967. He said at one point that these 
past months have been ‘the most distressing of my life.’”80  
 Given the pivotal role the Carter administration expected Jordan to play in 
arrangements for the West Bank, and the difficulties already evident in bilateral relations, it is 
extraordinary that there was so little consultation with Amman before and during the Camp 
David summit. The difficulty was recognized. A State Department planning paper stated that 
“our problem in the area is confidence: it is acute in Jordan . . . Hussein quite frankly tells us 
he sees an erosion in our position.” Arab leaders wanted the administration to “stop trying to 
find schemes for getting around Israel’s refusal to make the commitment to withdraw . . . and 
start trying to find ways to get the Israelis to change their position.” This shift was essential 
“if we are to have any chance of ever getting Hussein to join the negotiations.”81 
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 Before the summit Carter and Hussein did exchange letters, with Carter writing on 
August 15, 1978 to explain his decision to call the meeting. Hussein once again highlighted 
what he saw as key sections of the text in his private files. Carter wrote that: “insofar as our 
efforts at Camp David are concerned, we will be guided by our views on a just and lasting 
peace which we have consistently conveyed to you over the months past.”82 Hussein’s reply, 
sent on August 27, focused on this section, noting that he was particularly grateful for “your 
assurance that your efforts at Camp David will be guided by your views on a just and lasting 
peace which have been the subject of our talks and contacts since the beginning.” But he went 
on to issue a warning about what might result: “it is feared here in Jordan that the inability to 
achieve . . . genuine progress in the talks, as a result of Israel’s proven intransigence, might 
prompt the participants to issue a vague and uncommiting document of principles aimed at 
de-emphasizing the differences and inviting other participants.”83 It would be “unfair and 
unrealistic” to expect Jordan to shift its stand on principle in these circumstances. In 
discussion with Deputy Chief of Mission Roscoe Suddarth, Royal Court Chief Sharaf 
underlined that only a clear declaration that Israel would end the occupation would allow 
Jordan’s engagement in negotiations.84 A hint of the domestic pressures contributing to 
Hussein’s position was provided by Suddarth’s judgment that should he be maneuvered into 
entering the negotiations on uncertain terms, it was likely that both Prime Minister Mudar 
Badran and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Zeid bin Shaker would resign their 
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posts.85 While neither played a leading role in shaping Jordan’s foreign policy, both were 
significant figures in domestic politics, whose support Hussein could ill afford to sacrifice. 
In a reply to Hussein delivered on September 3, Carter emphasized his determination 
to spare no effort to achieve progress at Camp David, and his hope that a framework could be 
developed, based on Resolution 242, making it possible “to move to a new and broadened 
phase of negotiations in which Your Majesty would have an important role to play.”86  But 
Carter’s annotations on his Camp David briefing book were indicative of his frame of mind. 
In addition to “communications with Hussein,” he wrote that “Jordan’s timidity could block 
progress.”87  
Carter’s reference to communications with Hussein appears ironic in view of what 
subsequently took place. The State Department went to some lengths to ascertain Hussein’s 
likely whereabouts during the summit to ensure that he could be contacted if Carter saw fit.88 
It transpired that he would be in London from September 4 onward to attend the Farnborough 
air show. Full contact details were supplied by the Amman embassy. Hussein coupled his visit 
to the air show with another meeting with British Prime Minister James Callaghan at 4:30 
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p.m. on September 13. Beforehand, on September 12, Callaghan contacted Carter via the telex 
hotline between the Cabinet Office and the White House to ask whether there was any 
message he could pass to Hussein regarding the summit.89 No response arrived from 
Washington before the meeting, leaving Hussein to admit that “he was not well informed 
about the progress of the Camp David talks.”90 To compound matters, a message from 
National Security Adviser Brzezinski did finally arrive that evening after the meeting, stating 
that “if the Prime Minister had any further contact with King Hussein, the President would be 
very grateful for any further flexibility that Hussein could be brought to show.” The Prime 
Minister’s Private Secretary Bryan Cartledge annotated a question mark next to the words 
“further flexibility” and commented, “Prime Minister, Not very helpful!” Callaghan’s reply 
was even pithier: “NO,” he wrote.91 
 Part of the explanation for the failure to consult Hussein was the chaotic nature of the 
Camp David proceedings. After losing his initial hope that bringing Sadat and Begin together 
might produce a breakthrough, Carter spent much of his time simply trying to prevent a 
breakdown. Given the difficulties posed by the issue of Israeli settlements in the Sinai, it is no 
surprise that discussion of the West Bank was pushed down the agenda. Sadat’s 
disengagement left Carter administration officials in the paradoxical position of negotiating 
with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. Begin’s adamant refusal to accept that the 
withdrawal clause of Resolution 242 referred to the West Bank, meant that the crucial 
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paragraph 1(c) of the agreement was fudged, leaving the question of the final status of the 
territories to be determined through negotiation among the parties concerned, including 
Jordan.92 The outcome was thus what Hussein had feared. The administration had placed 
securing the prize of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement ahead of honoring U.S. commitments over 
the West Bank. 
 After the summit, Carter phoned Hussein. His presentation of the Camp David 
agreements is best described as an exercise in salesmanship. It was not an exercise in candor. 
According to Carter, “first of all, the Israelis accept the proposition that, in the West Bank, 
Resolution 242 applies in all its parts, all its principles and all its provisions.”93 This was not 
true. The Israeli delegation had stuck to its refusal to accept that Resolution 242 applied to the 
final status negotiations for the West Bank. Instead, the Camp David agreement dodged the 
issue by splitting the negotiations into two tracks, one over the future status of the West Bank 
and the other over a bilateral Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. The use of the term “the 
negotiations” allowed Israel to claim that Resolution 242 applied only to the bilateral 
negotiations with Jordan and not to the final status negotiations over the West Bank.94 
Secondly, Carter claimed, “the Israeli military occupation will be concluded immediately as 
soon as a self-government can be set up in the West Bank/Gaza.” But Begin had not agreed to 
abolish the Israeli military government, only to “withdraw” it. Subsequently it emerged that 
this meant merely a physical relocation of the military government that would continue to 
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exercise control over any self-governing authority the Palestinians might elect.95 Thirdly, 
Carter claimed, “there will be no new settlements in the West Bank or Gaza Strip during the 
time of the negotiations and any additional settlements would be as determined by the 
negotiations themselves.” But this was also not true. According to Quandt, “Carter knew that 
he did not have a clear-cut agreement with Begin on the question of settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza.”96 Although he could not have known just how far Carter’s presentation 
diverged from the reality behind the Camp David agreements, Hussein was well advised to 
stall and deflect Carter’s insistent requests for his engagement in the process. 
 In addition to his phone call, Carter sent two letters to Hussein. The first was a formal, 
type-written exegesis of the Camp David agreements.97 The second was a personal, hand-
written letter whose tone was half-pleading and half-threatening. On the one hand Carter 
warned that “a failure of our effort because of lack of support from other responsible and 
moderate leaders of the Arab nations would certainly lead to the strengthening of 
irresponsible and radical elements.”98 On the other, he pleaded that “I need your strong 
personal support.” It was the threatening element of the letter that most struck Prime Minister 
Mudar Badran.99 
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 The Jordanian Cabinet headed by Badran issued a statement on September 19 critical 
of the Camp David accords.100 Hussein continued to stall. During a meeting with Vance in 
Amman on September 20, he confined himself to posing questions about the Camp David 
agreements, requesting formal, written U.S. answers.101 In a press conference, Hussein 
commented, “there is a lot of vagueness that needs to be cleared up.”102 Continuity in U.S.-
Jordanian relations was not helped by the unfortunate timing of the handover to a new U.S. 
Ambassador in Amman, Nicholas Veliotes, who took up his post on September 17, the day 
the Camp David agreements were signed. But it is doubtful whether this change in 
representation made much difference to the subsequent precipitous decline in bilateral 
relations. Already some administration officials were acknowledging privately that relations 
with Jordan had been mishandled. Ambassador Atherton told U.K. Ambassador Moberly that 
Hussein was “very sore” about the Camp David agreements having laid down a specific role 
for Jordan without Jordanian participation, and acknowledged that “this section of the 
agreements might have been more tactfully phrased.”103 
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 Sadat now also made his own belated effort to win Hussein’s support for the Camp 
David agreements, through a letter sent on September 28. Unsurprisingly he attempted to put 
a positive gloss on what had been achieved over the Palestinian question, arguing that the 
agreement would have positive consequences “if we use it rightly.” Sadat’s gloss had a lot in 
common with Carter’s: he claimed Israel had been forced to acknowledge the applicability of 
Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza and that the agreement would stop the “cancer-
like spread of Israeli settlements.”104 But Hussein was unconvinced. He told Atherton that 
relations with Egypt were “now at almost their lowest ebb ever.”105 
 Hussein’s reply to Sadat spelled out the fundamental difference in their interpretations 
of the Camp David agreements. He warned of the dangers of Egypt concluding a separate 
peace with Israel and criticized the lack of any link between the two Camp David documents. 
The framework for comprehensive peace was vague and omitted crucial issues such as 
sovereignty over the West Bank and the fate of Jerusalem, matters no Arab leader could treat 
lightly. The transitional agreement for the West Bank was “useless” because Israel would 
continue its real politik by changing facts on the ground. The only way forward was for the 
Arabs to stay united and act as one bloc.106 
 The delivery of the U.S. answers to Hussein’s questions by Assistant Secretary Hal 
Saunders on October 16 did not improve the position. Hussein told Saunders he would not be 
ready to make a decision on whether to join the peace process until after the summit of Arab 
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leaders due to meet in Baghdad at the beginning of November.107 In fact, Hussein did not wait 
for the outcome of the Baghdad summit to make his decision. Instead, Carter’s failure to 
secure a clear, written commitment from Begin at Camp David regarding future settlement-
building in the West Bank now proved decisive. On October 26, Begin coupled an 
announcement of the Israeli cabinet’s approval of a draft peace treaty with Egypt, with an 
announcement that the cabinet had also decided to “thicken” a number of West Bank 
settlements through the addition of housing for several hundred extra families.108 From 
Hussein’s perspective, this provided tangible evidence that the Camp David agreements did 
not mean the end of settlement-building despite the claims made by Carter and Sadat. Apart 
from protestations, the Carter administration did nothing to press Begin to revoke the move. 
In a letter sent to Carter on October 31, Hussein now expressed his fundamental 
concerns about the agreements. The drafts of the letter show how the tone of his rejection was 
strengthened through a series of annotations on the original text, dated October 30. The 
sentence “there are some fundamental questions in our minds regarding the results of the 
Camp David agreements” in the October 30 draft became “from the very beginning there were 
some fundamental questions in our minds regarding the results of the Camp David 
agreements” in the final text. In the same vein, the sentence “allow me now to summarize to 
you our views here regarding the Camp David agreements and their chances of development 
into an acceptable and viable basis for future peace efforts” became “allow me to summarize 
to you our views here regarding the Camp David agreements and what we regard as a viable 
basis for future peace efforts” in the final text. The effect of these changes was clear. Hussein 
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did not believe that the Camp David framework could provide the basis for future 
negotiations. As far as he was concerned it was “time for a return to a collective context for 
the peace efforts.”109 
 The ensuing Baghdad summit witnessed concerted criticism of Sadat, the threat of 
Egypt’s isolation, and the removal of the headquarters of the Arab League from Cairo should 
he sign a separate peace treaty with Israel. It also witnessed the beginnings of a new, closer 
relationship between Jordan and Iraq, founded on King Hussein’s burgeoning friendship with 
Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussein. In conversation with Ambassador Veliotes, the King 
commended the “maturity that responsibility had brought to the Iraqi leadership.”110 From 
Washington, matters looked different. According to Carter, “all of us were angered when 
Hussein subsequently became a spokesman for the most radical Arabs.”111 When Hussein 
wrote to Carter again on December 29, further explaining Jordan’s stance, and offering to 
visit Washington “whenever you deem the time and circumstances appropriate,” Carter’s 
private response was dismissive. On the letter he annotated the words “Cy and Zbig. I am not 
interested in any visit by Hussein. No need to answer this for a while. JC.”112 
 An indication of the other pressures Jordan might now experience came during a visit 
by Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to Amman on December 3–4, 1978. In addition to 
underlining Congress’s support for Camp David, Byrd warned that Jordan’s stance might 
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have significant effects on bilateral relations.113 The same theme was taken up by Vance who 
expressed his concern to Veliotes that Hussein might not understand the negative impact in 
Washington of his shift from a passive stance to active opposition to the Camp David 
accords.114 While the threat remained implicit, the U.K. Ambassador in Amman reported that 
“it is clear that rightly or wrongly he [King Hussein] feels that in the course of the American 
effort to persuade him to join negotiations on the West Bank on the basis of the Camp David 
framework, he was subjected to a threat to withdraw financial support.”115 
 If bilateral relations were tense around the turn of the year, matters worsened 
considerably during March 1979 as the protracted negotiations to conclude an Egyptian-
Israeli Peace Treaty concluded. Having staked his dwindling personal prestige on securing a 
deal, Carter was not about to have it derailed by former friends and allies. “There are those . . 
. determined to undercut this achievement because it does not offer full and immediate 
solutions for all the problems of the Middle East, particularly for the Palestinians,” he wrote 
to Hussein. But in fact an Egyptian-Israeli agreement was the “indispensable first step toward 
peace.”116 In conversation with Assistant Secretary Saunders and Under Secretary Newsom, 
the British diplomat Anthony Parsons was struck by their combination of realism—“they 
made clear they were under no illusions about the future: Begin’s objective was to detach 
Egypt from the conflict and he had no intention of allowing genuine progress over the West 
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Bank”—and determination—“they made no bones about the powerful reaction there would be 
on the part of the administration and Congress toward any Arab ‘moderate’ state which set 
out to undercut the treaty.”117 The private comments of his officials thus exposed as hollow 
Carter’s claim that a bilateral deal was the essential first step to comprehensive peace. The 
fact was that the administration was focused purely on securing the immediate political 
dividend afforded by an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. 
 A seriously mishandled stopover by Brzezinski in Amman on March 18 now brought 
matters to a head. The visit was intended to impress on Hussein the need to support the 
forthcoming Egyptian-Israeli treaty, but all it did was render further damage to bilateral 
relations. Both Jordanian and U.S. officials subsequently admitted privately that the talks had 
gone badly. The publication of an interview with Hussein accusing the Americans of adopting 
“arm-twisting tactics,” and stating that he could not think why Brzezinski had come to 
Amman, confirmed the damage done.118 The meeting was a dialogue of the deaf. Hussein 
spoke of his pain that he and Carter had “lost touch with each other. From a good beginning, 
we went our different ways.” Then he tried to explain the transgression Sadat had made when 
he visited Jerusalem, against Islam and against Arab nationalism. “The real peace was 
derailed by Sadat,” he lamented. It was difficult to see how the United States could play the 
role of mediator, when it was “so committed to the support of the Zionists.” “At times like 
this, Jordan becomes an embarrassment,” he concluded.119  
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 In public Hussein was an outspoken critic of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. “The 
Egyptians regard other Arabs as a herd of sheep for whom Egypt chooses the course they are 
expected to follow unquestioningly,” he commented bitterly. As for relations with the United 
States, “if they consider us to be a problem in pursuing their policy, then I imagine we shall 
continue to be one.”120 In fact, bilateral relations had now reached their nadir and toward the 
end of 1979, a tentative improvement began, helped by regional developments. Hussein 
expressed both his strong sympathy for Carter during the Iranian hostage crisis and his firm 
opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.121 In these circumstances, the United States 
needed all the friends it could muster. In December, both Vance and Brzezinski recommended 
to Carter that he should determine Jordan was acting in good faith in the peace process. 
Without his endorsement almost all U.S. military assistance to Jordan would have to stop 
immediately under the terms of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979. In spite of 
the “differences over Camp David and the King’s ill advised intemperance earlier this year,” 
Brzezinski wrote, “the fundamental relationship is very important to U.S. interests.” Carter 
evidently found it much more difficult to let bygones be bygones. On Brzezinski’s memo he 
wrote: “it is a very close call, & difficult for me—but OK this time.”122 
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Caption: President Carter and King Hussein at the White House, June 17 1980, courtesy: 
Jimmy Carter Library 
 
 The much-postponed official visit by Hussein to Washington finally took place in June 
1980. There was a public effort by both sides to put a positive gloss on relations, helped by 
the fact that Hussein was accompanied by his fourth wife, the American-born Lisa Halaby, 
making her first visit back to Washington as Queen Noor of Jordan. Carter began his toast at 
the official dinner by paying tribute both to her and to the strength of the bilateral 
relationship.123 But despite the public display of closeness, the business sessions revealed 
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continuing differences. Both Hussein and Carter unburdened themselves in private of their 
bitterness about Camp David. In response to Hussein’s plaintive questions: “How did things 
go wrong? How did it reach this point?” Carter managed a half-apology: “perhaps it was a 
mistake to go so far with Camp David without Jordan . . . If we made a mistake, it was not 
deliberate.” But, he explained, “to be candid, he had felt Jordan had led the public 
condemnation of Camp David, even more than Iraq and Syria. He had had a grievance. 
Maybe he had expected too much; or assumed at Camp David to speak for Jordan. He (the 
president) has no criticism left: he understands better now.”124 After a visit by Hussein to the 
National Air and Space Museum, the following day Carter even promised him a flight in the 
newly-designed Space Shuttle, although he did note: “there is the problem of heat damage. He 
would be glad for His Majesty to go up in it sometime. We would try it out well, first.”125 
 That the rupture in bilateral relations would not fully be repaired while Carter 
remained president was reflected in Hussein’s reaction to the outcome of the November 1980 
presidential election. In a letter to vice president-elect George H. W. Bush, Hussein wrote of 
the moment he heard the result on Voice of America radio: “I recognized the voice of 
President Carter and within seconds realized that he was conceding defeat. It was a beautiful 
dawn to a new morning—a beautiful dawn to a fresh beginning and a new era, as I wrote to 
congratulate President-elect Ronald Reagan.”126 
 Regarding U.S.-Jordanian relations during the Carter administration, then, Hussein’s 
twin questions put to Carter during his visit to Washington in June 1980—“‘how did things 
go wrong, how did it reach this point?’”—can be posed by way of conclusion. The first key 
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problem was beyond Carter’s power to remedy. The course of bilateral relations since the 
1967 war, and the failure of successive administrations to implement the United States’ 
interpretation of Resolution 242’s withdrawal clause, left a legacy of skepticism and mistrust 
on Hussein’s part. This was the “Resolution 242 syndrome” of which he frequently spoke. 
But the fundamental shift in the Carter administration’s approach away from the multilateral 
Geneva framework toward a bilateral deal between Israel and Egypt after Sadat’s visit to 
Jerusalem was the second, key reason for the breakdown in relations. In this respect, the 
conclusions reached here differ significantly from those drawn by Jeremy Pressman in his 
analysis of the Carter administration’s approach to peacemaking. The administration’s 
protestations of support for a Palestinian homeland, for Palestinian self-determination, for 
Israeli withdrawal and for an end to Israeli settlement-building were no more than hollow 
words. When the time came for action, for example over settlements in the wake of Camp 
David, there was no serious attempt at enforcement. Instead, there was an attempt to foist 
responsibility for securing all of these outcomes onto a country not even represented at Camp 
David: Jordan. When Hussein refused to cooperate, Carter chose to blame him for the failure 
to enact the framework for comprehensive peace agreed at Camp David. 
 The Egyptian-Israeli deal brokered by Carter at Camp David did have the positive 
effect of opening the way to a peace treaty between those two countries. But it also had 
pernicious consequences. With Egypt removed from the military equation, the Begin 
government had a freer hand to pursue its goal of redrawing the map of the region and settling 
the Palestinian question by force. The full-scale invasion of Lebanon launched in June 1982 
resulted in huge loss of life and suffering but did not settle the Palestinian question. Likewise, 
Egypt’s isolation in the Arab world as a result of Sadat’s signature of the peace treaty opened 
the way for Iraq to play a greater role in inter-Arab politics during the 1980s and thereby 
indirectly set the stage for Saddam Hussein’s subsequent military campaigns. The breakdown 
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in relations between the United States and Jordan also drove Jordan into the arms of Iraq in its 
search for budget security. Although U.S. policy toward the Palestinian question would come 
full circle and return, through the Reagan Plan of September 1982, to the promotion of the 
Jordanian role in the occupied territories, still from the Jordanian perspective the damage 
done by Camp David to U.S. credibility as an arbiter in the Arab-Israeli conflict was lasting. 
